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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
The discovery of petroleum resources represents a valuable opportunity to improve a 
country’s development. Sales of oil and gas can generate huge revenues and have the 
potential to raise living standards and improve economic growth. However, many countries 
fail to use the wealth that these resources represent. Living standards remain low and the 
nation is still poor in spite of their resource endowment. This is known as the ‘resource 
curse’. Research has repeatedly shown that resource wealth does not tend to create wealthy 
nations. On the contrary, there is often a decline in development1. This curse represents a 
missed opportunity to improve the country’s economic situation and social well-being.  
 
The resource curse is not inevitable though. Norway used the discovery of petroleum to 
improve economic development and benefit the country as a whole. It was one of the 
poorest countries in Europe at the beginning of the 20th Century, but it is now one of the 
richest2. It is ranked as the world’s seventh largest oil exporter and the second largest gas 
exporter3. The petroleum sector represents a 26% share of state revenues and 21% of 
Norway’s total value creation4. Norway is often cited as one of the best examples of how 
natural resources can be managed for the benefit of the population5. It has succeeded in 
defying the resource curse.  
 
This thesis will identify whether there are lessons that can be learnt from resource 
management in Norway and applied to help prevent the resource curse in developing 
countries. The core strategy in Norway was to channel the oil profits into an oil fund, but 
other methods were also important. The legal organisation of petroleum activities on the 
Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) played a fundamental role. Indeed, the extent to which 
any country succeeds in using its natural resources to improve development will depend on 
the application of an appropriate legal framework for exploiting them. It is the starting 
                                                          
1 Auty (1993) p1 
2 Duruigbo (2005) p9 
3 Hansen and Rasen (2012) 
4 Norvik et al (2010) Figure 1.2, p14 
5 Ryggvik (2010) p5 
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point of good resource management. The broad focus of this thesis is, therefore, to 
examine how petroleum law can be used to help prevent the resource curse.  
 
The particular focus is Norway’s petroleum law in relation to direct state participation 
(DSP) in petroleum activities. This is the direct financial investment of the state in a 
national oil company to perform petroleum activities on the government’s behalf. 
Norway’s legislative framework for DSP played a key role in enabling the country to 
overcome the resource curse. The government used DSP to benefit the population in a 
number of ways.  As an example, it facilitated the integration of the petroleum sector into 
the wider economy, significantly improving the growth of related Norwegian industries. 
Ultimately it is these economic benefits that will have a longer life than the petroleum 
industry itself. Moreover, the experience of directly participating in petroleum operations 
improved the government’s ability to manage the wider petroleum industry in a manner 
that furthered the national interest. The main objective of this thesis is to identify whether 
other countries can learn lessons from how DSP was structured in Norwegian petroleum 
law in order to realise the potential benefits natural resources represent. 
 
1.1 The structure of the text  
 
The structure of this thesis is designed to provide an understanding of the Norwegian 
system of DSP and whether it could be applied to address the resource curse elsewhere. 
Thus, in Chapter Two the issues facing resource rich developing countries will be outlined. 
This provides the background for analysis as it is the problem that DSP needs to address. 
The legal principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources will then be 
explained to show why it is that natural resources should be managed in a way that benefits 
the population. Following this is an outline of the solution proposed by the Natural 
Resource Charter. Chapter Three describes the system of DSP and its role within the 
Norwegian petroleum sector. The benefits it gave Norway and how the government 
structured the system to achieve these benefits will be explained in detail. Chapter Four 
identifies the features that enabled DSP to function effectively in Norway. This gives an 
indication as to whether the system has the potential to be applied in other countries. 
Chapter Five provides an analysis of the lessons that can be learnt by developing countries 
from the Norwegian legislative structure of DSP. The overall objective is to assess whether 
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this system could be applied to address the resource curse outside of the Norwegian 
context.  
 
1.2 Legal sources  
  
The starting point of this thesis is Norwegian petroleum law, which sets out the legislative 
framework for its petroleum sector. International law will also be used to underpin my 
analysis. This includes the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
which formally places the benefit of natural resources in the hands of citizens. It also 
includes a ‘Natural Resource Charter’. This is a document compiled by world experts in 
politics and economics who have created an ideal legal framework for resource 
management. These are my primary sources.  
 
In order to evaluate the Norwegian legal framework, I will use evidence from economic 
and political scientists as my secondary resources. This research provides evidence of the 
impact of the law and thus provides the critical perspective on Norwegian DSP. These 
researchers will be used to identify the advantages and disadvantages of using the 
Norwegian legal structure of DSP. Since laws governing resource management aim to 
address economic and political issues, indications of its success or otherwise must come 
from economic and political sources. These sources demonstrate the implications and 
actual outcomes of the law and are therefore the focus of my research.  
 
Thus the particular methodology used is a literature review. I will use a combination of 
online resources, journals, books and statistical research. Evidence will be taken from 
scholars discussing a range of countries and legislative regimes. They include economists 
and political scientists such as Al Kasim, Nelsen and Noreng that provide an analysis of 
the Norwegian petroleum industry, and experts in other models of resource management, 
such as Victor, Hults and Thurber. Other research focuses on analysing the different 
methods of resource management, as opposed to specific country analysis. This includes an 
extensive research project into NOCs by The World Bank and a study on the effects of 
privatisation by Wolff and Pollitt. The literature will show the potential economic and 
political implications of transferring the Norwegian legal system of DSP beyond the 
Norwegian context. 
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Chapter 2 Background 
 
2.1 The problem of ‘the resource curse’ 
 
The resource curse is a frequently occurring and contradictory economic situation where 
resource rich countries perform worse than less well-endowed countries. In order to 
understand whether DSP has the potential to overcome this issue, we must first understand 
the problem in greater detail.  
 
The resource curse is essentially a failure to use natural resources in a manner that benefits 
the population. In some countries though, the detrimental effects go well beyond a lack of 
economic growth. The discovery of natural resources has been blamed for causing 
corruption, autocracy, high levels of inequality and even civil war6. This is most clearly 
visible in certain African countries: oil resources have contributed to civil strife in The 
Congo, The Sudan and Angola and endemic corruption and extreme poverty in Nigeria7. 
These countries provide a stark illustration of the daunting problem that mismanagement of 
natural resources represents.  
 
The causes of the resource curse are numerous and include economic, political and social 
problems8. The primary cause is that petroleum resources represent a huge source of 
income.  This creates an incentive for those in power to engage in ‘rent-seeking’, corrupt, 
behaviour. This weakens democracy because rulers are not reliant on taxation for revenue 
and thus do not need the vote of their citizens to stay in power9. Rulers are also able to use 
petroleum revenue to keep themselves in power and repress their opponents. Put simply, 
high economic rent increases the probability of poor wealth management and oppressive 
                                                          
6 Humphreys (2005), X. Sala-i-Martin and A Subramanian (2003), Tsui [2005]  
7 Nigeria is amongst the fifteen poorest nations in the world and the poverty rate between 1970 and 2000, the share of the 
population subsisting on less than one dollar a day, increased from close to 30% to just under 70%  Sala-i-Martin and A 
Subramanian (2003) pp 4 and 35 (Figure 1A) 
8 Duruigbo (2005) pp13-21 
9 Humphreys et al (2007) p4  
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behaviour, which can undermine, rather than enhance, a country’s economic and political 
situation.  
 
There is though great variation in the way countries have responded to the discovery of 
natural resources. A comparison between Nigeria and Indonesia illustrates this. 
Approximately thirty years ago Indonesia and Nigeria had similar per capita incomes and 
both depended heavily on oil sales. Indonesia’s per capita income is now four times that of 
Nigeria10. The 2011 UN Human Development Index highlights more broadly how some oil 
and gas producing countries have performed much better than others. Norway is at the top 
of the Index and The Netherlands is third, while other petroleum producers such as The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, The Sudan, Nigeria and 
Angola all rank at or close to the bottom of well-being statistics11.  This indicates that 
developing countries in particular struggle to use natural resources in a manner that 
benefits, rather than harms, the population. However, it also shows that the resource curse 
is not inevitable since not all petroleum-producing countries suffer from it. 
 
The focus of this thesis is addressing causes of the resource curse in the upstream sector; 
capturing the value of the resource, as opposed to the downstream sector; how that value is 
used by government. Corruption, weak state institutions and information asymmetries 
between government and multinational oil companies have all been blamed for a failure of 
the state to capture the true value of sub-sea petroleum resources12.  Any legal framework 
that could address the problems upstream has the potential to be part of the solution to the 
resource curse.  
 
2.2 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources  
 
The principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources explains why it is that 
government must seek to use natural resources for the good of its citizens and gives this 
argument legal grounding. Put simply, it means that natural resources belong to the people 
of the territory in which the resources are found. A logical consequence is that a 
government, acting on behalf of its people, has a duty to use those resources in a manner 
                                                          
10 Humphreys et al (2007)p2, and Ross (2003) pp13-15 
11United Nations Development Programme (2011) pp 127-130 
12 Humphreys et al (2007) pp xi and 4, Duruigbo (2005) pp18-21 
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that benefits the owners of that resource. Any solution to the resource curse must enable 
the state to uphold this principle.  
 
Norway used DSP in a manner that benefited its population and thereby complied with the 
Principle of Permanent Sovereignty. Indeed, the state’s founding aim for the petroleum 
industry was to improve the development of Norwegian society. This is clear from 
Norway’s Petroleum Act 1996 s1-2, which states ‘Resource management of petroleum 
resources shall be carried out in a long-term perspective for the benefit of the Norwegian 
society as a whole’13. It was the opinion of the Norwegian government that its petroleum 
legislation should be designed with this principle at its core.  
 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources is a key principle of international law, 
which applies to other countries in the same way as it does to Norway.  The General 
Assembly gave recognition to the principle in Resolution 1803 (XVII) in 1962. The 
Resolution provides that states shall strictly and conscientiously respect that ‘the right of 
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must 
be exercised in the interests of their national development and the well-being of the people 
of the state concerned’14. Further to this, violation of this right was declared to be in breach 
of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The principle developed out of the colonial 
period and the political claim of newly independent states to take control over their natural 
resources. Its reason for being was to improve the economic development of these 
countries and is a basic constituent of the right to self-determination 15. Resolution 1803 
reflects the sovereign right of a state to control the exploitation of resources on their 
territory, but additionally imposes an obligation on states to exercise this right in the best 
interests of its citizens16.  
 
The principle of Permanent Sovereignty was later consolidated in international law. 
Further General Assembly Resolutions strengthened its standing and Common Article 1 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Cultural, Economic and Social Rights made it a binding part of international human rights 
                                                          
13
 The Petroleum Act, Act 29 November 1996 No. 72, s1-2 
14 UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII) para 1 
15 Kilangi (2008) 
16 Elian (1979) p98 
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law. The right is also enshrined under Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights, proclaiming that ‘All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no 
case shall a people be deprived of it’.  In the East Timor Case Judges Weeramantry17 and 
Skubiszweski18 referred to the principle as being part of international law with erga omnes 
character. Today it is generally accepted that Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources is a prerequisite for economic development and thereby a fundamental principle 
of international law19.  
 
Thus it is not simply a moral obligation that a government manage resources to benefit the 
nation, but a legal duty with a corresponding right that citizens can expect this to be done20. 
However, while the principle establishes a legal right, it does nothing in and of itself to 
solve under development. It is a legal prerequisite to economic development, but requires 
further expansion for its founding purpose to be fully realised. The issue is whether the 
Norwegian structure of DSP could be part of a legal solution to this economic problem. 
 
2.3 The Natural Resource Charter  
 
The Natural Resource Charter (NRC) proposes a universal solution to the resource curse. It 
is  ‘a global initiative designed to help governments and societies effectively harness the 
opportunities created by natural resources’21. It aims to enable the use of natural resources 
as a ‘pathway out of poverty’ for developing countries. The Charter constitutes a set of 
guiding principles identified by leading economists, lawyers and political scientists and has 
at its core the principle of Permanent Sovereignty as its legal and philosophical 
underpinning22. As such, the NRC is the point of reference for this thesis.  
 
                                                          
17 East Timor Case (1995) Separate Opinion of  Judge Weeramantry, pp142, 221 
18 East Timor Case (1995) Separate Opinion of  Judge Skubiszweski, pp 127 
19 Nincic (1970), Perrez (1996)  
20 This duty has been recognised by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in African Commission on 
Human Rights in Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) v. Nigeria (2001) 
21 Collier et al (2010), p20 
22 See, for example, Collier et al (2010) p1:  ‘governments of resource-rich countries, ... have both the sovereign right and 
the moral responsibility to harness natural wealth for the benefit of their peoples’ 
 8 
 
The NRC consists of twelve ‘precepts’ to inform decision-making from the point of 
discovering natural resources. Each precept provides guidance on a stage in the decision-
making process, from extraction to the use of the revenue generated. The authors see the 
resource curse as a consequence of misguided and short-sighted choices made by those in 
power. The Charter recognises that resource management is a complex process, but if each 
‘link’ in the decision-making chain is complied with, it can generate economic growth and 
improve the welfare of the population. The NRC does not dictate a detailed legal structure. 
It recognises that this depends on the objectives and needs of the particular country in 
question. Instead it is a framework with which particular decisions should comply to 
maximise the opportunities provided by resource wealth. These precepts apply to all 
extractive industries and are presented as being universally applicable.  
 
The preamble to the Charter takes an expansive view of the potential benefits, stating that 
‘Exploitation of natural resources should be pursued in order to help a country meet its 
broader social and economic goals’23. It is a development opportunity that can be used to 
improve the country as a whole, in the long term, and in a comprehensive manner. A 
successful petroleum sector needs to fit into a country’s economic future. This means that 
government, as the key decision-makers in this process, must recognise their responsibility 
to manage resources for the benefit of their people. The overall aim of the solution 
proposed by the Charter is to enable governments to realise this objective. This is also the 
objective of this thesis. 
 
2.4 The Natural Resource Charter and direct state participation 
 
Precept 6 relates to direct state participation of a nationally owned resource company in 
developing a resource base. In the oil and gas sector, this is a national oil company (NOC) 
participating in upstream petroleum activities. Precept 6 outlines how a NOC should be 
organised. The consensus is that it can be beneficial, but only if managed correctly, since 
many NOCs have performed poorly24.  The NRC guidance can be categorised into the 
internal and external legal organisation of the NOC: 
 
                                                          
23 Collier et al (2010) p1 
24 Collier et al (2010) p10 
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· Internal organisation: nationally owned resource companies should:  
 
Have the ultimate objective of becoming commercially viable; 
Have a limited functional scope; 
Avoid engaging in governmental activities, such as social functions and distributing 
subsidised output; 
Avoid engaging in regulatory functions to avoid conflicts of interest between public and 
commercial goals 
Be professionally managed; 
Be transparent;  
Operate as efficient revenue generating operations 
Be able to adapt to changes in the economic environment  
 
· External organisation: the government should ensure that: 
 
The NOC operates in an open and genuinely competitive environment with other 
companies 
The NOC is organised as a separate legal entity with clearly established authorities and 
objectives and by having governing and management boards separate from the 
government.  
Independent government entities conduct the licensing, technical and regulatory 
supervision of the resource sector  
 
The Charter recognises that a well-managed NOC can assist economic development and 
have other social and political benefits. It could be a part of the solution to the resource 
curse, but only by complying with the principles under Precept 6.   
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Chapter 3: The Norwegian petroleum sector: direct state participation in context  
 
Precept 6 of the NRC indicates that Norway’s use of DSP has the potential to help 
governments use petroleum resources to benefit the population. However, it also suggests 
that this depends on the specific organisation of DSP in Norwegian petroleum law. This 
will be addressed in Chapters Three, Four and Five. Chapter Four addresses how DSP 
worked in Norway and Chapter Five explains why it worked in Norway. First though, 
Chapter Three puts DSP in the context of the Norwegian petroleum sector as a whole. The 
legal arrangement of Norwegian DSP within this context and the benefits it achieved for 
Norway will be presented. The description shows that Norway’s legal organisation of DSP 
helped to prevent the resource curse. This indicates that it does indeed have the potential to 
address the resource curse beyond the Norwegian context.  
 
3.1 Direct state participation in context: the Norwegian state’s objectives for the petroleum 
sector  
 
The government’s main concern for the future of its petroleum industry was that it would 
benefit all of Norwegian society. The means to achieve this was good resource 
management. The ‘10 Oil Commandments’ reflect this overarching objective25. This is a 
White Paper from the Parliamentary Committee on Industry and was unanimously adopted 
by the Norwegian Parliament in June 1972. In particular, Commandments 1, 4, 7 and 8 
reflect the desire for a comprehensive and controlled approach to oil policy:  
 
1. National supervision and control must be ensured for all operations on the NCS. 
4. The development of an oil industry must take necessary account of existing industrial 
activities and the protection of nature and the environment. 
7. The state must become involved at all appropriate levels and contribute to a 
coordination of Norwegian interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the 
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creation of an integrated oil community, which sets its sights both nationally and 
internationally. 
8. A state oil company will be established which can look after the government’s 
commercial interests and pursue appropriate collaboration with domestic and foreign oil 
interests26 
 
These founding principles remain relevant today and are reflected in the Petroleum Act 
1996 s1-2 27 
 
3.2 Norwegian oil policy 
 
In order to realise these objectives, the Norwegian state considered it of paramount 
importance to maintain national control over its petroleum sector. The ability to exercise 
this control derives from the Law of the Sea Convention, Articles 77(1) and 77(2) 
(UNCLOS). This international convention grants the state ownership of its sub-sea 
resources located on its continental shelf and the exclusive right to exploit these resources. 
The system that developed in Norway must be seen in connection with this basic state 
ownership28. The ‘exclusive right’ means the state must grant express permission to any 
outside entity wishing to exploit its sub-sea resources and can impose any conditions it 
sees fit on the grant of this right. This is the legal underpinning of Norwegian oil policy. 
The characteristic features of Norwegian oil policy include the licence system, state 
organised licence groups and state participation within these groups29.  
 
3.2.1          Norwegian petroleum legislation 
 
The main source of current Norwegian petroleum legislation must be outlined at the outset. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
25 Innst. S. no. 294 (1970-71) 
26 Innst. S no. 294 (1970-71) 
27 The Petroleum Act, Act 29 November 1996 No. 72  
S 1-2 Resource management of petroleum resources shall be carried out in a long-term perspective for the benefit of the 
Norwegian society as a whole. In this regard the resource management shall provide revenues to the country and shall 
contribute to ensuring welfare, employment and an improved environment, as well as to the strengthening of Norwegian 
trade and industry and industrial development, and at the same time take due regard to regional and local policy 
considerations and other activities. 
28 Hammar et al (2011) p28  
29 Hammar et al (2011) p28  
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The Petroleum Act 199630 regulates the significant stages of petroleum activities and 
establishes a framework for state management of petroleum resources. S1-1 reflects Art 
77(1) UNCLOS. It vests the property rights to sub-sea resources located on the NCS in the 
Norwegian state. S1-2 first paragraph reflects Art 77(2) UNCLOS. It states that resource 
management is exercised by The King and decisions of The Norwegian Parliament. The 
King in this context means The Cabinet. Pursuant to these powers, the state established its 
legal framework to exploit petroleum resources and regulate the companies conducting 
petroleum activities on the NCS. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), referred to 
as ‘The Ministry’ under the Petroleum Act, has been delegated overall responsibility for 
resource management in the petroleum sector. It is the MPE that administers the licence 
system.  
 
3.3 The licence system  
 
The Norwegian state implemented a concessionary system whereby foreign oil companies 
must apply for a licence to exploit petroleum on the NCS. The companies own the 
petroleum they produce, but the state controls how this is done.  
 
This licence system ensured that the government maintained oversight and control at each 
important stage of petroleum activities.  This was emphasised in Parliamentary Report No. 
25 by the Ministry of Industry, stating that the organisation of petroleum activities must 
‘provide Norwegian authorities with full control of all stages in the operation: exploration, 
production, processing, export and marketing’31. No major petroleum activities could be 
conducted without prior government approval. This is explicit under the Petroleum Act s1-
3 ‘None other than the State may conduct petroleum activities without the licences, 
approvals and consents required’. A separate licence is required for exploration activities, 
production activities and to install and operate facilities for transportation and utilisation of 
produced petroleum32. The MPE stipulates the terms of each licence and additional 
approvals may be required for other significant activities.   
 
 
                                                          
30 The Petroleum Act, Act 29 November 1996 No. 72  
31 Parliamentary Report No. 25 (1973-1974) Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society 
32 The Petroleum Act, Act 29 November 1996 No. 72, Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and section 4-3 PA 
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3.4 State organised licence groups   
 
The MPE selects a group of suitable companies to create a licence group for each licence it 
grants. This is another feature of Norwegian oil policy: the state considered it better 
resource management to have several oil companies conducting oil activities rather than 
one company acting alone. The MPE invites oil companies to apply for a licence to explore 
or produce petroleum in a defined licence area. On the basis of these individual 
applications, the MPE organises the licence group. The licensees are chosen on the basis of 
financial strength and experience in petroleum operations. In the early years the Ministry 
would also consider whether the applicant would be contributing to the Norwegian 
economy33 .The licensees are obliged to enter a Joint Venture Agreement with one another 
and conduct petroleum operations in partnership. Petroleum is produced jointly, but each 
licensee owns its proportionate share of produced petroleum. This process ensured 
government discretion over who and how activities were conducted.  The NOC would 
participate in co-operation with foreign oil companies, but did not need to apply for a 
licence itself.  
 
3.5 State participation within the licence groups  
 
The eighth ‘Oil Commandment’ shows that the state aimed to create a NOC to look after 
its commercial interests within the licence groups.  In 1972 a 100% state-owned company, 
Statoil, was established by decision of the Norwegian Parliament. This entity directly 
participated as a fully operational oil company in every licence group from the third 
licensing round in 1974.   
 
According to Noreng there were three main objectives for DSP: 
  
1. Revenue: securing the highest possible share of the earnings from oil, excluding tax and 
royalties 
2. Government control: ensuring more direct control of operations than is possible through 
the licence system alone 
                                                          
33  This could be through marketing in Norway, constructing refineries, using Norwegian ships etc. In addition, a 
condition for granting the licences was that the applicant would utilise onshore bases in Norway and use Norwegian 
labour, Al Kasim (2006) pp19-20. 
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3. Know how: to learn as much as possible about the oil industry through active 
cooperation with private companies34 
  
These aims are clear from the government papers debating the establishment of Statoil, 
stating that DSP would ‘besides the opportunity for greater economic revenues, secure 
direct state influence in the activities, at the same time as being able to develop more 
comprehensive Norwegian know-how’35. 
 
The legal structure of Norwegian DSP will first be outlined to show how the Norwegian 
government set about achieving these aims. The actual contribution of DSP to these stated 
aims will then be discussed.  
 
3.6 The organisation of direct state participation in Norwegian petroleum law   
 
The ‘Norwegian model’ of DSP included a 100% state-owned NOC and two independent 
legal entities to regulate this company: The MPE and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD). 
 
3.6.1          Statoil: the national oil company 
 
Statoil is Norway’s NOC. When created in 1972, it was as an ordinary joint stock company 
under Norwegian company law36, but with all the shares held by the Norwegian state37. 
Thus Statoil’s legal status was somewhat unclear at this stage, being a business enterprise, 
but with complete state ownership, which implied a national purpose.  
 
This national purpose was to uphold the government’s commercial interests in licence 
groups and to serve as a vehicle for technology transfer and economic development38. 
Statoil was thus an instrument of the Norwegian state, but unlike most state-run entities, it 
was structured as a relatively autonomous company. The directors held the main 
responsibility for fulfilling Statoil’s commercial mandate. They were given a large degree 
                                                          
34 Noreng (1980) p121 
35 St.prp.nr.113 1971-1972:8 
36 Limited Liability Companies Act (1957) 
37 Mestad (1985) pp 65-66 
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of freedom from the government in making these commercial decisions39. Furthermore, 
Statoil’s own fortune was formally separated from the state treasury because it was 
governed by Norwegian company law. Thus it did not need the state’s permission to use its 
own money40. It paid taxes, as other oil companies did, and the state earned money through 
dividends as company shareholder. Thus Statoil was essentially a commercial enterprise, 
but acted primarily in the state’s interest, rather than its own private interests.  
 
Statoil’s legal status has been reformed considerably since its creation. These reforms were 
designed to reflect the state’s changing objectives for its NOC and to ensure the company 
continued to function in an efficient manner. This legal reform is a key part of the 
Norwegian Model for DSP and will be discussed as such in Chapter Four. 
 
3.6.2          The responsible authorities 
 
The legal organisation and mandate of the authorities responsible for the petroleum sector 
were designed to maximise state control and to promote good resource management. The 
system is structured in a hierarchical manner. The Norwegian Parliament (The Storting) 
makes the main decisions and sets the key principles. The government has the overall 
responsibility to see to it that these principles are followed. The MPE is the delegated 
government department with specific responsibility to regulate activities on the NCS. The 
NPD is subordinate to the MPE and responsible for regulating the day-to-day activities on 
the NCS, while Statoil, like the other oil companies, is subject to the decisions of both the 
NPD and the MPE41.   
 
The overarching function of Statoil, the NPD and the MPE is to ensure good resource 
management of petroleum activities. Their relationship to one another was structured in 
law to enhance this purpose. The key roles were clearly separated between these three, 
independent, legal entities in what is known as a tripartite system. The MPE has the main 
policy making function, the NPD is responsible for regulating the oil companies and Statoil 
                                                                                                                                                                               
38 Stenvoll (2007) p23  
39 Mestad (1985) p67  
40 Mestad (1985) p72  
41 Mestad (1985) p47  
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was made responsible for the state’s commercial interests. This prevented overlap of 
responsibilities and conflicts of interest between these key functions. 
 
3.6.3          The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate 
 
The MPE is central to the legal and administrative system for resource management on the 
NCS. It took over responsibility for the sector from the Ministry of Industry in 1978. This 
ensured that the necessary considerations in petroleum activities were safeguarded by a 
separate sector ministry dedicated to these activities42. The MPE was made specifically 
responsible for the formulation of oil policy and the licensing system. It works with the 
political leadership to plan the development of the sector and does the preparatory work 
prior to the Cabinet granting production licences. All other major licences and approvals 
are issued directly by the MPE pursuant to the Petroleum Act 199643. Thus, while the 
ultimate legislative and executive power rests with the state, the central governing 
functions rest with the MPE.  
 
The NPD was established simultaneously with Statoil in 1972 as a separate government 
entity. It was made responsible for technical and regulatory supervision and guidance in 
the petroleum sector. It compiles data, collects fees, sets regulations within its areas of 
responsibility, and advises the Ministry on technical matters44. It is subordinate to the MPE 
and, while the MPE has overall responsibility for resource management, the NPD has more 
day-to-day, technical and regulatory control. It also handles the more detailed approvals 
and consents45.  
   
This division of commercial, regulatory and policy functions into three independent legal 
entities enables the state to have greater control over petroleum activities. This tripartite 
system is an essential part of the legal framework for Norwegian DSP.  
 
 
                                                          
42 The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2003) 
43 The Petroleum Act, Act 29 November 1996 No. 72, see I particular Chapters 2, 3 and S 4-3  
44 Thurber et al (2011) p5367 
45 Hammar et al (2011) p11  
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3.7 The contribution of direct state participation to Norwegian oil policy  
 
The state’s objectives for DSP were to increase revenue, know how and control. In the 
following sections, the contribution that Statoil made to these goals will be described.  
 
3.7.1          State revenue  
 
DSP significantly contributed to state revenue. Statoil was granted a 50% participatory 
interest in each licence, giving the state a proportionate share of the value of the resource 
extracted. This was in addition to the revenue received from royalties and taxation of the 
oil companies in each joint venture. The state optimised government take by mandating 
further privileges for Statoil. The ‘sliding scale’ provision was introduced in the fourth 
licensing round in 1979. If a field was deemed commercial, Statoil reserved the right to 
increase its participating interest by up to 85%, depending on the size of the field. In 
addition, Statoil’s exploration costs were ‘carried’ during the exploration phase, reducing 
capital investment during this uncertain phase of activities.  
 
The Statfjord Field provides an example of how DSP contributed to state revenue.  This 
field was discovered in a block during the third licence round. This was the first round 
during which Statoil held a 50% interest. This field would turn out to be one of the biggest 
reservoirs in the world.  By this time the oil price had also risen to four times that of the 
year prior to the Statfjord find46. Had the state not secured Statoil’s 50% interest at this 
early stage, it would have failed to captured significant revenues from this giant field.  
 
3.7.2          Government control  
 
DSP was at the centre of the government’s strategy to ‘steer’ petroleum activities in the 
national interest. It was the primary tool of direct control over Norwegian resources47. The 
presence of Statoil in each licence group secured government influence at each important 
phase, during exploration, development and production. The 50% participatory interest 
gave Statoil a significant degree of influence in each management committee of each joint 
                                                          
46 Ryggvik (2010) p31  
47 Nelsen (1991) p41  
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venture and a veto-right over decisions. This effectively gave the state a controlling interest 
in virtually every producing field covered under licences awarded after 197348.  This 
enabled the authorities to maintain close control over the direction, tempo and impact of 
petroleum activities on the NCS49.  
 
The importance of this national influence within licence groups was demonstrated at the 
initial stages of developing the pipeline network. The pipeline network is used to transport 
oil and gas from the field to the European and UK markets. Whoever secures control over 
access to the pipeline network also, in effect, controls access to the market. Monopoly over 
the market can develop through strategic ownership of a pipeline network. In the Ekofisk 
field, the American oil company Philips insisted that as owner of the field it should also 
own the connecting pipeline. The pipeline from Ekofisk was of particular strategic 
importance. It had the potential to be a ‘trunk pipeline’, connecting other fields to the 
market50. The Norwegian state challenged Phillips to gain state control over this pipeline. 
In doing so the 50% share for Statoil was secured, effectively preventing Phillips obtaining 
a decisive ownership position. This also opened the way for Statoil to take over as operator 
of the pipeline at a later point51. The Norwegian state, through DSP, secured this strategic 
position, ensuring state control over the development of the pipeline transport network.   
 
3.7.3          Know how  
  
DSP gave Norway a ‘window to the oil industry’. Through Statoil, Norway developed 
hands on technical and managerial experience of oil operations. In doing so, it generated 
expertise that could be used to strengthen its position against the international oil 
companies. Norway was able to overcome the information asymmetries between oil 
companies and government authorities. As a result, the balance of power turned in favour 
of the Norwegian state. The knock on effect was an ability to negotiate more favourable 
conditions for the state because it knew the true value of its resource base. It could, for 
example, demand more stringent and favourable terms and higher tax rates over time, to a 
large extent as a result of the learning process of a fully operational NOC. 
                                                          
48 Nelsen (1991) p59 
49 Al Kasim (2006) p242 
50 Ryggvik (2010) p29 
51 Ryggvik (2010) p29 
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3.7.4          Norwegianisation  
 
In addition to increasing revenue, control and know how, the state oil company was also 
involved in the ‘Norwegianisation’ process.  This policy objective was based on a desire to 
build up a strong domestic industry with both oil companies and suppliers52. It is alluded to 
under the third Oil Commandment ‘that new industry is developed on the basis of 
petroleum’ and was formally declared in the Royal Decree of 8th December 1972. This 
objective became another means of using petroleum activities to benefit the Norwegian 
society as a whole.  
  
According to Corti and Frazer, Norwegianisation consists of three elements: 
  
1. Increased equity shares and operator responsibilities for the three Norwegian oil 
companies: Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga 
2. Increased use of Norwegian goods and services in petroleum activities 
3. Norwegian industrial development53 
 
This process was primarily implemented through regulations and conditions attached to 
licences. However, Statoil also played an important role. It was, as a Norwegian company, 
both a part of the Norwegianisation process itself and helped to further implement the use 
of local content54. Firstly, Statoil and the two other Norwegian oil companies Hydro (51% 
state-owned) and Saga (private) were singled out for special treatment by the state to 
encourage the development of a Norwegian petroleum industry. This preference was clear 
from the privileges granted to Statoil and the appointment of Norwegian oil companies in 
licence groups and to the position of operator; the most influential position in a joint 
venture. In the third licence round Norwegian companies were appointed operator in eight 
of the twelve licences (four to Statoil). This trend continued in the fourth licence round of 
the ‘Golden Block’55. Secondly, designating the role of operator to Statoil increased the 
use of Norwegian goods and services. Statoil, as operator, had the corresponding 
                                                          
52 Rasen (2102) pp13-14 
53 Corti and Frazer (1983) p70 
54 Nelsen (1991) pp70-72 
55 Nelsen (1991) p71  
 20 
 
responsibilities for procurement, enabling the state to direct the use of Norwegian as 
opposed to foreign industry. This Norwegianisation process was an indirect and broader 
means of benefiting the Norwegian society through petroleum activities. 
 
These four main outcomes show that DSP furthered the Norwegian state’s objectives for 
its petroleum sector. This in turn indicates that it is desirable to make the system work in 
other countries rich in natural resources.  
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Chapter 4 How the Norwegian state achieved the benefits of direct state participation  
 
The following chapter describes how the state used Statoil to achieve the objectives 
outlined in Chapter Three. This is the ‘story’ of the development of Statoil. Chapter Three 
described the company’s role and legal status in Norway. This Chapter will show how this 
changed according to the changing needs of the country. During the early years of the 
Norwegian petroleum sector, Statoil was legally granted certain privileges to enable it to 
achieve the government’s objectives at this particular stage. Once it became a powerful 
company and the state changed its objectives for the petroleum sector, Statoil went through 
major legal reform.  This chapter is designed to illustrate the complexities of controlling a 
NOC so that it acts in the interests of the state and thus does in fact help prevent the 
symptoms of the resource curse.  
 
4.1 The early years  
 
4.1.1          Statoil’s legal privileges  
 
Statoil was granted significant privileges during the early years. This enabled the state to 
build a strong and competent NOC and rapidly achieve its objectives for DSP. These 
privileges were a 50% participatory interest in each licence group, the ‘carried interest’ 
provision and the option to increase its participatory interest if a field was deemed 
commercial. These privileges helped to maximise the government revenue from and 
control in each licence group.  
 
During the first licensing rounds, prior to the establishment of Statoil, the government 
agreed to relatively poor conditions for itself, which benefited the foreign oil companies56. 
This included large licensing areas, low royalty levels and tax reductions to encourage the 
oil companies to invest in the NCS. The results highlight the importance of Statoil’s 
privileges during the early years. The first concession round was the largest Norway ever 
                                                          
56 Ryggvik (2010) p19 
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offered and Norwegian companies were only given minimal shares in twenty one of the 
three hundred and forty six blocks allocated. By chance Hydro had a 6.7% interest in the 
block that was found to contain the Ekofisk field. Had the Norwegian state mandated DSP 
and an option to increase its share at this stage, the income from the Ekofisk field could 
have been far greater. The rights of a NOC may need to be less stringent during the initial 
phase so as not to deter foreign oil companies. However, the experience from the Ekofisk 
field demonstrates the importance of securing DSP and mandating certain privileges as 
early in the process as possible. 
 
4.1.2          The role of system operator  
 
A key means of gaining know how and control was to assign the role of operator to Statoil. 
This is a strategic and influential role sought after by the oil companies. For example, 
several foreign companies rallied for the position in the giant Statfjord field. Mobil was 
assigned the role, but on the condition that it train Statoil as operator and hand over the role 
ten years after the field became commercial.  Statoil was assigned the role of operator in 
several other joint ventures. Operatorship ensured state presence at every important stage, 
‘conquering the strategic heights’ of petroleum activities as the most influential position in 
a joint venture.  The position maximised state influence in each licence group and enabled 
it to gain expertise over and above that of an ordinary licensee.   
 
4.1.3          Control over Statoil 
 
The legal framework governing the relationship between Statoil and the state 
 
How the state controlled Statoil during the early years made an important contribution to 
the government achieving its objectives for DSP. In the process of creating a NOC, the 
government emphasised the need to ensure adequate control over its policies and actions57. 
White paper no. 113 to the Storting (1972) stated in this regard ‘the Ministry of Industry 
will underline that the authorities will at all times have control over the companies 
activities since the state as a 100% owner will have the full instruction right in accordance 
with the rules of the law on public share holding companies’.  
                                                          
57 Al kasim (2006) p179  
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Statoil was controlled by several state entities; the NPD, MPE, the government and 
parliament. Each entity had a separate function to prevent a conflict of interest arising that 
could undermine state control over Statoil. The legal framework for political control aimed 
to ensure that the new state-owned oil company functioned for the benefit of Norwegian 
society as opposed to its own, private interests58. The methods for controlling Statoil 
consisted of oversight, reporting and accountability requirements. 
 
Reporting regulations ensured Statoil made sound decisions in managing the state’s 
commercial interests. Under Article 10 of Statoil’s Articles of Association, the board of 
directors was legally obliged to ‘submit to the General Meeting …all matters which are 
presumed to involve significant political questions or questions of principle which might 
have important affects on the nation and its economy’. The Minister for Petroleum and 
Energy was Statoil’s General Assembly who called an annual General Meeting and had the 
discretion to call for extraordinary General Meetings if required59. Article 10 also required 
an annual plan on all aspects of Statoil’s future activities to be submitted to the MPE. 
Statoil’s annual plan was commented upon and amended where necessary by the MPE. It 
was then submitted to parliament for discussion and approval. Biannual reports were also 
submitted and quarterly meetings held with the relevant authorities. Article 10 was 
implemented to ensure that no significant decisions were made without prior approval. It 
also enabled greater state oversight of the company’s activities. This was particularly 
important considering the significance that oil activity was to have on the Norwegian 
economy60.   
 
The integrity of the information submitted by Statoil to the authorities was ensured by legal 
requirements and institutional checks. Firstly, all licensees operating on the NCS were 
required to submit large amounts of information to the Ministry. Since each company in 
every licence group had to submit information, this acted as a check on the reporting of 
other companies within the same licence group. Secondly, the Minister had rights as an 
observer in the meetings of the management committee of each joint venture. The MPE 
could also draw on the independent expertise of the NPD.  These checks could be used to 
                                                          
58 Nelsen (1991) p37  
59 Al kasim (2006) p179 
60 Richardson (1981) p39 
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verify the information supplied by Statoil and were intended to ensure that it would not 
conduct its own policy or steer the MPE61. 
 
In addition, in Norway there is a tradition of informal dialogue and co-operation between 
government and industry. This supplements and enhances the formal procedures. This is a 
significant aspect of how the Norwegian petroleum industry functions, but will not be 
expanded upon in this thesis because it is unrelated to law. Nonetheless, it is important to 
be aware that it has played a significant role. Considering all formal and informal oversight 
mechanisms the state had at its disposal, the amount of information passing between the 
Ministry and Statoil was quite considerable62. 
 
4.2 Statoil’s changing role as an instrument of the state  
 
The legal framework governing Statoil aimed to allow the company to develop into a 
powerful instrument for the state, while at the same time control it to ensure that it did 
indeed act in the state’s interest.  Throughout the seventies there was political consensus on 
the need to develop a strong, influential and competent oil company through which the 
state could pursue its national objectives63. The dilemma that emerged was how to 
reconcile political control with the maximum possible freedom for the state oil company in 
its commercial operations64. By the 1980s it was clear that this balance needed to be re-
instated. As the balance of power began to tip in favour of Statoil, important reforms were 
introduced to adjust both the control of and role of Statoil as a policy instrument.  
 
4.3 The problems emerge  
 
4.3.1          Losing control  
 
As Statoil became an increasingly strong oil company, it began to wield some political 
power. The rising wealth of Statoil, its privileged position in licence groups, combined 
with its ever-growing expertise, enabled the company to become too influential. The 
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formal mechanisms of controlling the company began to show signs of strain.  
 
Statoil was in a dominant position in relation to other oil companies and, to some extent, in 
relation to government authorities. The voting rules and guaranteed 50% interest in each 
licence group meant that the company held a veto right in decision-making procedures. 
Alternative views could thus be subdued and Statoil could commit licensees, as well as the 
authorities, to decisions that were difficult to reverse politically65. Furthermore, disparities 
between the government authorities and Statoil began to emerge. Statoil was able to 
develop greater expertise, human capital and financial capacity than the NPD66. This is 
significant because the role of the NPD was to regulate Statoil and unequal capacity 
undermines this element of governmental oversight. There was concern that the NPD was 
not able to stay ahead of Statoil and control its activities effectively. Moreover, Richardson 
suggests that the MPE was also not regulating Statoil as it should. Although difficult to 
substantiate, the suggestion is that Statoil was granted want it requested with few 
exceptions67. Concerns were raised that Statoil could overwhelm the petroleum policy-
making structure68.   
 
Problems also began to emerge with the formulation of Statoil’s reports to the MPE on its 
business plans. These reports had to submitted at regular intervals under Article 10 of 
Statoil’s articles of association69. They became a point of contention between Statoil and 
the authorities. The MPE on the one hand wanted more information on future plans, 
investment and cost predictions70. On the other hand, Statoil was concerned that its 
business dealings with private companies could be undermined by the constant public 
scrutiny. Thus for Statoil the goal in writing the Article 10 plans was to reveal as little as 
possible about the company’s forward planning71. This lack of information would 
undermine the government’s ability to approve and evaluate its plans and thus control its 
future activities before irreversible actions were taken. On the one hand Statoil wanted 
greater independence, while the state needed to restrain this freedom to remain in control. 
This issue is also illustrative of the emerging conflict between Statoil as an instrument of 
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67 Richardson (1981) p40  
68 Nelsen (1991) p78 
69 See s 4.1.3, para 3 
70 Nelsen (1991) p78 
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the state and Statoil as a commercial enterprise. 
 
4.3.2          Policy instrument vs. commercial enterprise 
 
Problems also began to emerge with the commercial efficiency of Statoil’s operations. It 
became increasingly clear that the company needed to be exposed to market forces and that 
a change in this direction would be in the interests of both Statoil and the state.  
 
4.3.3          The Mongstad scandal  
 
The events of 1979-1985 over the Mongstad refinery would become the biggest industrial 
scandal in Norwegian history72. It gave a stark illustration of the need to expose Statoil to 
market forces. 
 
The Mongstad project was controversial and met with opposition from the beginning. 
Statoil wanted to invest downstream and made plans to upgrade and expand the refinery. 
Norsk Hydro and the conservative party in opposition both argued that such a project 
would not provide sufficient return on investment73. After intense political lobbying by 
Statoil, the plans were eventually approved in June 1984 and given a budget of NOK 4.920 
Billion74. The project overran its budget by 100%. Statoil had been aware of cost overruns, 
but did not inform the authorities until two years had passed. The company was criticised 
in a report by the MPE for a serious lack of leadership and proper management. Another 
report by the Auditor General accused Statoil of covering up the costs and criticised the 
MPE for not obtaining verifiable information from the company throughout the project75. 
The scandal led to the resignation of a number of Statoil’s board and Arve Johnsen, the 
company’s CEO76. The events highlighted the benefits that exposure to market forces could 
bring to the performance of the company. 
 
Events internationally and domestically following the Mongstad scandal would strengthen 
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the call for greater commercial efficiency. Statoil again experienced significant cost 
overruns, this time at the Åsgard Field and the Snøhvit project. Moreover, the oil price 
crash in 1998 weakened the overall profitability in the oil industry. The lower profit 
margins resulting from the increased cost of conducting petroleum operations and the 
lower price of oil changed the priorities of both Statoil and the state. The government was 
now mainly concerned with maximising oil revenue. Statoil had served its initial purpose 
and the government wanted to focus on maximising return on its investment. Statoil 
wanted greater commercial freedom to expand internationally and less state oversight of its 
actions77. Thus it was now in the interests of both Statoil and the state to re-structure the 
legal framework governing Statoil’s role and powers in a manner that increased its 
commercial efficiency. 
 
4.4 Reform of Statoil: stage one 1984 
 
With effect from 1st January 1985, Statoil was reorganised in what became known as the 
‘1984 Reform’78. The government and parliament reached a solution to help normalise 
Statoil’s position to that of a strictly business company, without excessive decision-making 
or financial advantages79. The essential concern was to make Statoil a more useful servant 
to society80.  
 
Statoil’s privileges were largely removed and a distinction was made between the 
company’s licence shares and those of the state.  Three main legislative changes were 
introduced81: 
 
1. To moderate Statoil’s economic growth, a distinction was made between the shares that 
generated revenue for Statoil and those that generated revenue directly for the state; the 
state direct financial interest (SDFI). This would re-direct some of Statoil’s revenue 
directly to the state and put more of the oil income under the direct control of the Storting. 
 
2. Statoil’s financial advantages were removed, including the carried interest and sliding 
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scale provisions. These privileges were only to be exercised in favour of the state’s share. 
This also helped to dampen Statoil’s financial strength and equalise its position in relation 
to other licensees, although it did retain the right to a 50% interest in all licence groups.  
 
3. Statoil’s administrative advantages were removed. It no longer had the right to vote the 
state’s entire share in each licence group and now needed one of the other companies to 
vote with it to block or pass a measure. The General Assembly, on approval from the 
Storting, retained the discretion to instruct Statoil to veto a decision in exceptional 
situations82.  
 
These changes aimed to put Statoil on a more level playing field with other companies 
operating on the NCS and force it to act more like a private enterprise.  Statoil’s role as a 
policy instrument continued, but greater emphasis was now placed on Statoil as a 
commercial enterprise83. 
 
4.5 Reform of Statoil: stage two 2001 
 
The 1984 reform was only the first step in Statoil becoming a more commercially oriented 
company. In light of the cost overruns at Mongstad and other projects, the declining price 
of oil and the desires of Statoil itself to expand its operations, a second major reform was 
implemented in 200184 
 
Firstly, Statoil was partly privatised and introduced on the New York and Oslo stock 
exchanges in June 2001. Statoil was now organised as an ordinary, limited liability 
company as opposed to a state-owned company.  The state maintained a majority stake in 
the company at 81.7%85 and thereby reserved a degree of influence. Despite this, the main 
effect of partial privatisation on the state’s relationship with its NOC was to put it on an 
equal footing with other shareholders86. The MPE was now prohibited from consulting 
Statoil on commercial issues. Meetings with the MPE were now the same as meetings with 
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other investors. Thus a more business-oriented relationship was created with Statoil and a 
clearer distinction was thus made between government authorities and the now partly 
private NOC. 
 
The Norwegian constitution does not allow a partly privatised Statoil to manage the SDFI.  
Thus, the second part of this reform was to transfer responsibility for managing the SDFI 
to a new government entity: Petoro87. Petoro is formally a licensee and takes part in the 
decision-making process in joint ventures, but it was not designed to be another oil 
company.  It is structured as a 100% state-owned, non-operating company and does not 
generate its own income. All of its operating funds come from the state treasury88. Its 
internal relationship to the state is essentially the same as Statoil’s was prior to 
privatisation. However, unlike Statoil, it does not apply for licences, perform any operator 
responsibilities or sell the state’s shares of produced petroleum89. Statoil continues to sell 
the SDFI, but Petoro supervises this. Statoil was now structured as a purely commercial 
enterprise and Petoro a purely regulatory body.   
 
The 2001 reform meant that Statoil was removed from managing the state’s business 
interests and was no longer a vehicle for the Norwegian state. This is how the structure of 
state participation on the NCS stands today. It has enabled Statoil to focus on maximising 
profit and expand its operations internationally. It continues to bring in significant revenues 
to the state, but is no longer a policy instrument as it was during the early years. 
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Chapter 5:  Distinctive features of Norwegian direct state participation: the key factors 
contributing to its success   
  
DSP was part of the reason that Norway avoided the resource curse and managed to use its 
natural resource endowment to benefit the population90. This success can be attributed to 
certain legal and non-legal factors that were implemented as part of the petroleum sector or 
existed prior to the discovery of petroleum on the NCS.  This chapter identifies these 
factors and how they contributed to the success of Norwegian DSP. They have been taken 
from a range of sources and compiled to show the most salient and commonly cited aspects 
of the Norwegian system that enabled Statoil and the principle of DSP to work effectively 
for the benefit of the population91 
 
5.1 Legal factors 
 
Certain aspects of Norway’s legislative framework for its petroleum sector made an 
important contribution to the success of DSP. Norwegian petroleum law laid down the 
model system of separating functions between government entities, the rules for ensuring 
transparency and accountability in the petroleum sector and a licence system that created 
competition between Statoil and foreign oil companies. Each of these legal factors will be 
discussed in turn.  
 
5.2 The separation of functions model  
 
A key principle of the Norwegian system of governance is to separate functions between 
government entities. In the Norwegian petroleum sector this has meant separating three 
state-controlled institutions, each with its own distinct role: the regulatory (NPD), policy-
making (MPE) and commercial (Statoil). Each of these bodies is independent and has an 
arms length relationship with the other entities. This tripartite separation between 
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commercial, policy, and regulatory functions has become known as the “Norwegian 
Model” of oil sector governance92. 
  
This administrative structure has a number of advantages. Firstly, it avoids any conflict of 
interest arising between the regulatory/policy-making bodies and the commercial entity.  
Each function entails a different set of interests, which may conflict in certain situations. 
The regulator must consider the long-term interests of the population as a whole, while the 
commercial entity focuses on maximising profits93. If the same institution were responsible 
for both roles, the drive to increase profit could compromise the need to regulate certain 
actions that generate profit, but harm broader interests. Maximising the revenue of a NOC 
should not be at the expense of other important interests. In the Norwegian context, the 
main non-commercial interests are protecting the environment, other industries such as 
fishing, and the principle of extraction at a moderate tempo. These interests need to be 
balanced with the profit motive94. Thus it is important that the regulator and the policy-
makers are formally separated into two entities, distinct from the commercial objectives of 
the NOC.  
  
Separating responsibilities into three distinct entities also enables each role to be performed 
more effectively. Firstly, the government and the MPE are able to maintain a much higher 
degree of control over Statoil. Where a NOC performs both the regulatory and commercial 
functions it can quickly grow to become a very powerful entity, undermining government 
influence over its actions. In the Norwegian system, the government always maintained the 
full right of instruction through the Cabinet, the MPE and the NPD95. Secondly, it also 
improves the commercial role of the NOC. Where the NOC carries out both commercial 
and regulatory functions, this can lead to business distrust between the international oil 
companies (IOCs) and the NOC96. This can undermine the relationship of the NOC and 
IOCs and thereby the state’s commercial interests. The NPD emphasises its objectivity in 
regulating petroleum activities to reassure the IOCs that this is done in a neutral manner. In 
contrast to Statoil, the NPD is able to perform this task without bias to Norwegian 
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commercial interests and acts as a ‘faithful guardian of the public interest’97. Thus the 
separation of functions model also improves the standard to which each function is carried 
out. 
 
Separating functions also had the advantage of focusing Statoil more clearly on the state’s 
business interests.  This contrasts to other NOCs, which often have pressure to perform 
non-commercially. Sonangol, the NOC of Angola, runs an airline, bank and telecoms 
company and NNPC, the NOC of Nigeria, runs social programmes, in addition to its core 
activities. Statoil’s more specific function helped it to focus on its key purpose and to avoid 
becoming embroiled in politics. According to Stenvoll, this independence from politics was 
critical in Statoil’s development as a successful commercial entity and its ability to take on 
necessary, but risky investments98.  
 
5.3 An accountable and transparent petroleum sector  
  
Statoil was governed by legal norms that ensured its decisions were transparent and public 
sector agencies were accountable for their actions. This prevented corruption and fostered 
good practice within the petroleum sector. There was a clear set of internal regulations for 
Statoil and the other entities, such as the reporting requirements discussed above and laws 
that limited and clarified the powers of each entity99. The legal system in Norway was able 
to enforce transparency and accountability and thereby upheld these principles. This 
instilled confidence in the sector from IOCs. For example, licensees could appeal decisions 
of government agencies, reassuring the foreign companies that they would not be unfairly 
treated, despite the presence of Norwegian commercial interests in joint ventures. In 
addition to the legal norms, Norway had an existing tradition of transparency, openness 
and integrity in its civil service100. As a result of this transparent system, the Norwegian 
petroleum sector has thus far been free from corruption and the licensees and authorities 
are able to cooperate effectively.  
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5.4 Competition between oil companies 
 
A criticism often made of public enterprises is under-performance because of the lack of 
incentives generated by commercial competition. Due to the joint venture system, Statoil, 
to a certain extent, conducted its petroleum activities in a competitive environment. This is 
regarded as having improved Statoil’s performance. Participating as a licensee in joint 
ventures meant that the NOC’s performance would be benchmarked against other oil 
companies101. The presence of more than one Norwegian oil company was of particular 
importance. According to Al Kasim the presence of both Statoil and Norsk Hydro 
improved efficiency and prevented a monopolistic dominance by one company102. This 
indigenous competition for assets between Hydro, Saga and Statoil is a distinguishing 
factor between Norwegian and other NOCs because it faced more pressure to perform 
financially103. This feature has been termed a ‘value adding force’ because is seen as 
having increased the revenue generated by Statoil104. The Storting recognised this, stating 
that, ‘active competition between several competent companies helps to ensure the best 
possible use of resources. In this way we ensure that they sharpen themselves against each 
other’105. Having Statoil operate in a competitive commercial environment thus improved 
its ability to generate revenue for the government.  
 
5.5 Non-legal factors: Norway’s privileged starting point 
 
The following features are independent from law and were already present in Norway prior 
to discovering petroleum resources. They include a well-functioning civil service, 
possessing the tools to quickly and competently establish a NOC, and the ability to attract 
foreign oil companies relatively easily. These factors enhanced the success of DSP and the 
formal legal framework. They put Norway in a privileged position to achieve success in 
the petroleum industry, but are often lacking in developing countries. Isolating these 
factors will indicate whether lessons could be learnt in developing countries or if DSP is 
too specific to Norway to be workable elsewhere.  
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5.5.1          A competent bureaucracy 
  
The administration of DSP depended on a well-functioning bureaucracy. The separation of 
functions model can only be an effective framework if those who work within it are 
competent. Petroleum activities are highly expensive, thus swift and accurate management 
by government agencies is needed106. Furthermore, the success of DSP also depended on 
the MPE and the government being able to adapt the system to changing national and 
international conditions. For Statoil, the ability of the state to reform its structure, legal 
status and privileges was particularly important as the need for greater commercial 
efficiency increased. This involved a significant reassessment of the links between Statoil 
and the state. The legal solution that the Norwegian bureaucracy created has been termed a 
‘Norwegian Innovation’107. Norway was able to create a more profit-oriented company and 
avoid the poor-performance often associated with NOCs. Thus the Norwegian civil service 
were important both in effectively carrying out the roles of regulator and policy maker, and 
in having the necessary knowledge and foresight to change policy and reform institutions 
when good resource management required it.  
  
5.5.2          Enterprise capacity  
  
Norway was fortunate to have the necessary tools in place to mobilise its own petroleum 
operations. Al Kasim has termed this ‘enterprise capacity’ and states that ‘the high level of 
enterprise capacity in Norway before the oil age was one of the most important factors 
contributing to its success as a petroleum nation’108. The building blocks for developing its 
own oil company were already in place at the time of the first oil discoveries. The main 
factors relevant to DSP included: technological expertise in related industries, a developed 
institutional framework, available infrastructure, a high level of education and relevant 
skills, a stable economy, experience in state participation in other industries, traditions of 
transparency and competence in the civil service109. For example, Norwegian universities 
were able to quickly develop the relevant research institutions and educate new personnel 
with specific knowledge of petroleum activities. Norway’s stable economy and efficient 
administration ensured that the necessary expertise and technology could be adapted to 
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petroleum activities in an efficient and reliable manner. This enabled the state to 
successfully implement DSP and for Statoil to become a competent oil company in a 
relatively short space of time.  
 
5.5.3          The Norwegian Continental Shelf: an attractive and stable investment  
 
Statoil’s success was dependent on foreign oil companies; they were its source of know 
how and revenue. Thus the success of the Norwegian state’s own investment was reliant 
upon attracting competent and financial strong IOCs to enter into joint ventures with 
Statoil. These companies provided the experience necessary for Statoil itself to become a 
competent oil company. They also ‘carried’ Statoil’s exploration costs and made the 
resource discoveries, which enabled Statoil to produce and generate revenue for the state. 
Thus Norway had to ensure it remained an attractive investment prospect. 
 
A stable political and legal system  
 
Norway’s political system meant the country was more able to attract foreign investment. 
Norwegian oil was located in a politically stable democracy, which re-assured IOCs that 
their investments would be secure110. All binding agreements, such as licences, fiscal and 
royalty terms and joint ventures with Statoil, were almost certain to be respected. This 
secure and predictable system has meant that oil companies are more willing to make large 
investments and enter into joint ventures on the NCS111. The Norwegian legal system also 
reassured oil companies that if issues did arise with the state, there would be recourse to 
justice. Thus Norway’s status as a stable democracy gave foreign oil companies confidence 
and encouraged them to invest from the early stages of petroleum activities. Since Statoil 
relied upon foreign companies, the political situation in Norway contributed significantly 
to the success of Norwegian DSP.  
 
Resource base and geographic location  
 
Norway’s proximity to the European market and the high value of its resource base also 
made it an attractive investment prospect. The estimated ultimate petroleum potential of 
                                                          
110 Noreng (1981) p74 
111 Al Kasim (2006) p129 
  
 
36 
the NCS is 13.1 billion standard cubic meters of oil equivalents, making the country very 
rich in petroleum112. The timing of the first discoveries also coincided with high oil prices 
following the first dramatic rise in prices from 1973113. Norway also had relatively easy 
access to the European market, with discoveries in close proximity to the continent114. This 
guaranteed the sale of produced petroleum to offset exploration, production and 
transportation costs. This is of particular significance for gas. Norway’s geographical 
location made it possible to sell the gas without excessive investment in pipelines to 
transport it to the continent. Thus investment in the NCS was more likely to be profitable 
than in a country with a less valuable resource base and high transportation costs to a 
distant market. 
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Chapter 6: Lessons that can be learnt by developing countries from the Norwegian model 
of direct state participation 
 
This thesis has shown that DSP helped the Norwegian government to realise the benefits of 
its petroleum resources and thereby aviod the resource curse. This suggests that the system 
has at least the potential to address the resource curse elsewhere. The problem for 
developing countries is that they do not have the same advantageous starting point as 
Norway when establishing their petroleum sectors.  They lack many of the ‘building 
blocks’ identified in Chapter Four that facilitated the legal framework for DSP to function 
effectively. The question is what lessons can be learnt by countries that lack these ‘building 
blocks’ from the legislative design Norway used for structuring and regulating its NOC. 
Which features should be transferred to developing countries to give DSP the best chance 
of preventing the resource curse?  
 
Firstly, it will be demonstrated that DSP should be used by developing countries because it 
is more appropriate than the alternative system: a liberalised petroleum sector. A liberalised 
sector has its advantages, but these advantages do not necessarily benefit the citizens and, 
moreover, certain fundamental benefits of using a NOC are lost. This focuses the question 
because it is no longer an issue over whether developing countries should use a NOC, but 
how best to manage that NOC. This leads to the second point of analysis: which legal 
features of Norwegian DSP could enable the system to work in developing countries? Each 
legal aspect of Norwegian DSP will be assessed to understand whether it could in fact 
assist developing countries in preventing the resource curse. Thirdly, the Norwegian model 
will be analysed in comparison with Precept 6 of the NRC. While the Norwegian model 
complies on the whole, certain legal norms are not in line with the Norwegian system. This 
suggests that the universally applicable principles of Precept 6 could be adjusted to take 
account of the fact that these legal norms did function effectively in Norway and thus may 
also function effectively elsewhere.   
 
6.1 The use of national oil companies: Statoil in context  
 
Many resource-rich countries have chosen to use a NOC. Norway is far from unique in this 
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sense. According to a 2007 study, nine of the top ten oil companies in terms of oil reserves, 
and all top ten in terms of gas reserves, are NOCs115. Of world proven oil reserves of 1,148 
billion barrels, approximately 77% of these resources are under the control of NOCs with 
no equity participation by foreign IOCs116. Moreover, most of these companies are located 
in developing countries. Thus DSP is already a central part of many domestic oil sectors 
and fundamental to resource management on a global scale.  
 
The popularity of NOCs in the petroleum sector grew out of a desire to establish greater 
national control over this strategic resource. Initially, private oil companies had dominated 
the industry, but, after World War II, the prevailing view was that states could and should 
take control over their own resources. This was articulated in the emergence of the 
principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in international law and direct 
participation through ownership was seen as a key part of this117. For example, in 1968 
OPEC, issued a ‘Declaration of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries’, which 
encouraged members to develop their petroleum directly, resulting in the establishment of 
a number of NOCs in these countries. Statoil was established in this context, along with 
several other NOCs throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. 
  
However, these state-owned enterprises were criticised as being commercially inefficient 
and, following a decline in the price of oil, many chose to privatise their NOCs during the 
1980s and into the 2000s118. While Norway chose to partially privatise its NOC, others 
fully liberalised the industry, most famously Great Britain. While there has been a 
resurgence in the popularity of NOCs, this criticism remains relevant today. It is concerns 
over finance that are the key arguments against deciding to directly participate in 
petroleum activities.  
 
6. 2 A national oil company vs. a liberalised petroleum sector 
 
Petroleum operations are highly expensive and return on investments cannot be 
guaranteed. Where return is generated, it can take many years before a field becomes 
commercial. The main issue in petroleum operation is that resources cannot be directly 
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seen - they can only be inferred from data and surveys during the exploration phase119. 
Thus, petroleum activities involve a high degree of financial uncertainty. As a result, using 
state funds and taxpayers money to participate directly as an investor is a high-risk activity. 
This is exacerbated in developing countries that, at the outset, lack financial security and 
the technological and managerial skills to create a well-functioning NOC. Leaving this risk 
to the private oil companies by liberalising the petroleum sector and taxing their income 
could, in terms of revenue, benefit the country more than using a state-owned company.  
 
6. 2. 1          The problems associated with using a NOC 
 
Commercial inefficiency 
 
State-owned oil companies are considered costly and commercially inefficient in 
comparison to private oil companies120. This is confirmed by research and empirical 
evidence121. Moreover, NOCs that are privatised have shown significant improvements in 
their performance122. Indonesia’s NOC, Pertimina, is illustrative of this lack of operational 
efficiency.  A management audit of Pertimina by PwC in July 1998 exposed losses of over 
$2 billion per year. Figures also show a significant efficiency gap: Pertimina’s direct 
production costs were US$ 5.50, whereas the industry average is US$ 1.20123. The 
Nigerian NOC, NNPC, also shows significant wastage, with estimated losses at between 
US$ 800 million and US$ 1 billion annually124. This begs the question whether private oil 
companies are in fact a more appropriate solution to the resource curse in developing 
countries. 
 
A key cause of this efficiency gap is the different incentive structures of private and public 
enterprises. The objective of a private oil company is to maximise shareholder value, to 
ensure profitability in the short and long term. There is a motive to achieve productive 
efficiency to hold down costs to enhance profitability125. This requires sound technical, 
financial and labour management. NOCs, on the other hand, are not subject to market 
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forces to the same degree. Efficiency suffers because there is an absence of the spur of 
competition126. NOCs tend to be over-staffed and paid more than market wages, are prone 
to corruption and patronage and show poor financial management127.  
 
Cost requirements  
 
The government must provide the funds to establish and run the NOC. If the company is to 
have a chance of functioning well, this will require significant capital investment in its 
initial set up, administration and operational activities. A developing country may be 
unable to afford this monetary burden. For instance, Nigeria has consistently defaulted on 
its contributory payments to its NOC in joint ventures over the years128. Moreover, in 
comparison to the requirements of other sectors, such as education, health and 
infrastructure, the budgetary demands of a NOC are very large129. It may be difficult to 
justify such a capital-intensive investment in countries where citizens see that their 
government is unable to fulfil other fundamental needs.    
 
Statoil was a costly, but relatively efficient NOC. In countries that lack the skills, 
institutions and knowledge necessary to ensure commercial efficiency, state ownership 
could result in financial losses.  Moreover Statoil, being entirely not partly state-owned and 
a fully operational company not just a holding company, is a particularly capital intensive 
and challenging model to replicate. Thus, the risks may outweigh the benefits in creating a 
NOC modelled on Statoil in less developed countries.  
 
6. 3 A liberalised petroleum sector: could this be a more appropriate solution? 
 
In a liberalised petroleum sector, all oil companies are privately owned and the government 
generates revenue via taxation and royalties alone.  This both avoids the financial risk of 
direct participation and could increase government-take if the oil profits can be channelled 
into the state treasury.  
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6. 3. 1          The advantages 
 
Commercial efficiency  
 
According to efficiency rankings in a study by Eller et al, the largest privately owned IOCs 
are the most efficient companies, in terms of revenue per employee and revenue per unit 
reserves, while NOCs tend to be in the bottom 20% of efficiency rankings. The average 
technical efficiency rankings of private oil companies were also significantly higher than 
NOCs130. It follows that a private oil company will tend to generate a higher return on 
capital than a state oil company of a similar size and operations131. These findings are also 
reflected in a study by Wolf, which suggests that preference for state oil will come at an 
economic cost132. This means that government take from a given resource base could be 
higher in developing countries if all oil companies operating on its continental shelf are 
private enterprises.  
 
Lower financial risk 
 
In a liberalised sector the state avoids the costs of establishing and running oil operations 
itself and receives a steady and fairly predictable source of income. Effective fiscal policy 
can be used to maximise the government’s share of oil rents. Neutral taxes and tax 
incentives can also help stimulate and sustain further petroleum development projects. Tax 
deductions mitigate high tax rates and encourage further exploration activities133. 
Focussing on enforcing well-designed tax laws could be a more appropriate use of public 
funds in developing countries134. The state could capitalise on the commercial efficiency of 
the private sector and focus on channelling these reserves into more pressing obligations to 
its citizenry135.  
 
6. 3. 2          The disadvantages 
 
The problem of institutional capacity  
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A liberalised sector requires strong institutional capacity and good governance in order for 
the state to receive the financial benefits of using this model. The government must be able 
to formulate and execute an effective fiscal policy and enforce its petroleum regulations. 
This can be particularly challenging in countries with weak institutions and little 
experience of dealing with powerful, multinational oil corporations. Thus it may not in fact 
offer a better solution for developing countries. Private oil companies generate more profit, 
but unless the government has a fiscal policy and institutions that capture an optimum 
share of this profit, the commercial efficiency of private oil companies does not benefit the 
country in question.  
 
Tax administration and imposition are highly demanding tasks for state institutions. 
Assessing the tax liabilities of each oil company is a complex task and there is a risk of tax 
evasion.  For example, in Nigeria, the lack of strong and independent regulations through 
the Federal Inland Revenue Service and Department of Petroleum Resources, allows the 
IOCs to interpret tax rules in an aggressive manner without being challenged136. Even in 
countries that have the necessary capacity, tax avoidance is still a problem. In the case of 
State of Alabama v Exxon Mobil Corp (no. Cv-99-2368) Exxon was found guilty of 
illegally deducting production costs from royalty payments, resulting in $63.6 million in 
unpaid royalties. In developing countries the risk of tax evasion is more acute because they 
do not have experienced bureaucrats to administer the complex tax structures137. This could 
amount to significant losses in state revenue.  
 
Thus, as with DSP, for a liberalised petroleum industry to benefit the state, it requires 
strong administrative capacity to regulate the private oil companies, oversee operations and 
take a fair value of the produced petroleum. Without this capacity, the asymmetries 
between IOC and government are likely to be exploited, to the detriment of the wider 
population.  
 
The lack of a broader purpose: profit making or policy instrument? 
 
A liberalised sector also leaves a gap in achieving any wider purpose with a country’s oil 
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industry. Profit making is only one argument in assessing the appropriate legal structure for 
resource extraction and fails to capture the broader purpose of a NOC138. The fundamental 
reason for state ownership of an oil company is to achieve aspirations that might not 
otherwise be attainable through taxation and regulation alone139. Without a NOC, the state 
loses its ‘window to the industry’ and the opportunity to achieve wider benefits related to 
preventing the resource curse. 
 
Statoil made a significant contribution to the government’s objectives for its petroleum 
sector. These benefits have been explained in Chapter Three and are likely also to be 
important for developing countries. These benefits are also reflected in the NRC, Precept 6. 
They include:  
  
· Exerting direct control over the pace of resource development, securing supply, or 
achieving other national objectives 
· Providing a viable vehicle for the country to build its own expertise and 
professionalism in the resource sector  
· Developing domestic capacity and supporting development of domestic linkages 
between the resource and other sectors  
 
These outcomes of DSP are based on research from natural resource sectors worldwide, 
which indicates that other countries also use a NOC to achieve broader objectives. For 
example, under-developed economies will be looking to build-up related domestic sectors 
and increase employment through their NOC. Generating know how is likely to be of 
particular importance. Direct experience through an NOC helps to overcome the 
information asymmetries that exist between the state and the oil companies140. With little 
oil expertise, these countries are vulnerable to agreeing poor terms that undervalue the 
worth of their resources. It is also considered important by many developing countries to 
assert their sovereignty over natural resources and a NOC facilitates this sense of 
ownership141. The popularity of NOCs in developing countries suggests that the priority of 
governments in these countries will continue to be more in line with the opportunities 
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offered by using a NOC than relying on private companies. Thus, it is perhaps unrealistic 
to suggest that a developing country should not directly participate in petroleum activities. 
The analysis is not so much if a country should chose to use a NOC, but how it should be 
structured and regulated in order to realise the potential benefits.  
 
6.4 Lessons that can be learnt form the Norwegian legal framework for its national oil 
company 
 
This section will identify and analyse the key features of Norway’s legal framework 
governing Statoil that could be transferred to resource-rich developing countries to help 
prevent the resource curse. The analysis will build on the factors that were identified in 
Chapter Four as being key to Statoil’s success. The general finding is that the framework 
Norway used helped to mitigate the risks of using a NOC by structuring the internal and 
external legal framework in a manner that mimicked certain aspects of a liberalised sector. 
DSP certainly has the potential to help overcome the resource curse in developing 
countries and the following legal features should be used as part of this solution.   
 
6.4.1          Internal legal framework  
 
Reform of Statoil: 100% state-ownership to part-privatisation   
 
Statoil was fully state-owned in the infant years of Norway’s petroleum industry, but 
during the mature phase it was partly privatised. This reflected the changing interests of the 
government. It was important to first build up a strong NOC, and then partly privatise it 
when the new priority was to maintain control and efficiency. In effect, the government 
restructured the law and legal status of Statoil according to the role it was to play for the 
country. This provides a useful template for developing countries. 
 
The priority of the early years was to exploit petroleum resources, but simultaneously 
ensure that the petroleum industry worked for the benefit of the Norwegian people. The 
state had to ensure that national interests were the guiding principles that prevailed in the 
industry142. A 100% state-owned NOC was the best means of ensuring this because it gave 
more direct influence in petroleum operations than regulations alone could bring. Complete 
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state-ownership is the most appropriate solution at the outset when direct national control 
is the priority.  
 
When circumstances changed, however, the role of Statoil and consequently its legal 
foundations also had to be reconsidered. From the late 1980s, maintaining outside 
investment and optimising the commercial efficiency of Statoil became the priority. Statoil 
was seen as having served its initial purpose; it now needed to focus on maximising return 
on the state’s investment. As a result the government introduced two main reforms. Firstly, 
Statoil’s financial privileges were removed because they were seen as a hindrance to the 
state’s current economic priorities. Mandating certain privileges for a NOC is important 
during the early years to build up a strong company and mitigate the investment risks for 
the state. It is important though to recognise when these privileges are no longer 
appropriate and introduce reforms to bring the NOC in line with private oil companies. 
However, this reform alone is unlikely to be sufficient to truly improve the commercial 
efficiency of a NOC.  
 
Partial privatisation was the government’s second solution to make a more significant 
impact on the commercial efficiency of Statoil. The result was greater productivity as a 
result of being guided by market forces, rather than bureaucratic logic.  For the state it 
meant increased revenue as the company’s biggest shareholder. Wolf and Pollitt studied the 
results of partial privatisation and found that Statoil improved its internal efficiency and 
financial performance significantly. Moreover, a calculation of the net present value of 
social benefits from part-privatisation came to between NOK 165.8 and 182.4 billion in 
2001 money. Wolf and Pollitt conclude that ‘oil privatisation, if implemented appropriately 
within a competitive petroleum sector, can generate substantial improvements in corporate 
performance and efficiency, as well as in social welfare’143. This clearly implies that other 
countries would be wise to follow this example of building up a competent NOC, then 
privatising at the appropriate time. 
 
The advantages of privatisation have also been demonstrated outside the Norwegian 
context. Brazil provides a useful example. Like Norway it partly privatised it NOC, 
Petrobras, and the state maintained a majority of shares. This was implemented during a 
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period of reforms to liberalise its petroleum industry in order to improve economic 
efficiency, increase revenue and attract foreign investment. Although it is difficult to 
attribute one cause, following liberalisation and part privatisation, Petrobras has improved 
its financial performance and increased its operations overseas144. This indicates that the 
Norwegian strategy of building up an oil company and then reducing state participation is 
replicable elsewhere.  
 
Following part privatisation, the Norwegian system more closely resembled a liberalised 
petroleum sector. The financial and political interests of the state were implemented solely 
through taxation and concession rules, laws and regulations145. Yet it was only after twenty 
years of direct experience in petroleum activities that the government decided it could rely 
on its laws and institutions alone to influence the industry. This process was, in a sense, the 
completion of the separation of functions model. Statoil became a purely commercial 
enterprise, with no role in furthering the state’s interests in licence groups, while the 
regulatory role of the state increased. New 100% state-owned institutions were created in 
management positions. Petoro took over responsibility for the SDFI and Gassco took over 
as operator of the pipeline network. Regulations and corresponding institutions were now 
highly competent and experienced in managing the petroleum sector. It is only after direct, 
hands-on experience that a government will be able to rely on its regulations and fiscal 
policy alone to manage the petroleum sector.  
 
Norway’s particular method of managing DSP, by first building up a strong NOC to serve 
national interests, then privatising when circumstances are appropriate, provides a useful 
model for developing countries. By directly participating, a government can develop the 
necessary expertise to be able to rely solely on regulations and fiscal policy at a later stage. 
 
Limited commercial function  
 
The NRC strongly endorses a limited, commercially oriented mandate for a NOC. This has 
worked well for Norway because it focussed Statoil on its responsibility for the state’s 
commercial interests. It should be considered though whether this is in fact ‘best practice’ 
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for all NOCs. It could be argued that giving the NOC a broader mandate would 
simultaneously increase the benefits of using a NOC. 
 
A NOC is clearly tied to national interests, but what is in the ‘national interest’ for a 
developing country may differ from that of a developed country. It could be more 
appropriate for a NOC to pursue non-commercial functions where government institutions 
fail to fulfil their welfare duties. NOCs are often used to pursue a broad range of national, 
social and political objectives that go well beyond the original purpose of generating 
revenue for the government146. Examples include the provision of infrastructure, such as 
schools, hospitals, roads and water supply, social programmes and subsidising energy 
prices147. This would appear to accommodate a broader range of needs and benefit a 
greater section of the population than a limited commercial mandate. 
 
However, research has shown that imposing a variety of objectives on a NOC conflicts 
with value creation and hampers profits148. Non-commercial functions impose additional 
costs and tasks that are unrelated to generating revenue. A number of these social 
programmes have themselves been criticised for being ineffective, inefficient or sources of 
patronage149. Venezuela’s NOC, PDVSA, provides a useful example of the effects that 
social objectives can have on the performance of a NOC. Between 1976 and the early 
2000s, PDVSA was a capable, high performance company. In 2003 President Chavez 
increased state influence over the company and converted it from a commercially oriented 
NOC to pursue social objectives. These included funding and managing social 
programmes, known as Bolivarian missions, such as improving inner city health care, 
literacy and food distribution networks. Although there is some indication that these social 
programmes contributed to a decline in poverty, the unpredictability and weight of these 
obligations reduced PDVSA’s capacity to maintain operations and investments150. Partly as 
a consequence of this, PDVSA’s performance has weakened151. It is generally agreed that 
government is better placed to perform these social duties.  
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While it may be tempting for developing countries to broaden the mandate of their NOC, 
they would be wise to introduce commercial functions only. The government is best placed 
to decide how to use the revenue generated from oil companies and this revenue is likely to 
be greater where the NOC is not involved in these political decisions.  
  
Transparency rules  
 
Norway had a clear and strict set of transparency laws governing Statoil. In addition, 
Norway’s legal system meant public institutions could be held accountable for their 
actions. These laws helped to prevent corruption within the Norwegian petroleum sector 
and enhanced the confidence of those investing on the NCS. In addition, the Norwegian 
system of separating functions between government agencies complemented these 
transparency rules. It acted as a system of checks and balances, with each separate 
institution providing oversight of another. This mitigates against any opportunities for 
corruption within public institutions. There is little to debate over whether these rules 
should be replicated in resource rich developing countries. The petroleum industry is 
frequently marred by ‘rent seeking’ behaviour because of the wealth involved and 
developing countries that often have existing problems with corruption are particularly 
vulnerable to this. Thus, while the success of any system will ultimately depend on the 
integrity and competence of the individuals employed within the framework, laws that aim 
to ensure accountability and transparency should always be implemented. 
 
6.4.2          External legal framework  
 
Hybrid governance: Norway’s joint venture system 
 
Statoil entered into joint venture agreements with private oil companies. This represents a 
hybrid legal framework, half way between liberalisation and nationalisation. The oil 
companies were taxed and regulated independently, while Statoil co-operated with these 
companies to achieve a broader mandate on behalf of the state. This helped to improve 
Statoil’s efficiency by introducing an element of competition. It also mitigated against the 
financial risk involved for the state in establishing a NOC and investing directly in 
petroleum activities.  
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The joint venture system improved Statoil’s efficiency. Working in partnership with private 
oil companies simulated an environment of competition. It provided the ability to 
benchmark the performance of Statoil by comparing its financial and operating 
performance with that of the IOCs. Furthermore, the IOCs took the role of operator in joint 
ventures during the early years, which helped to ensure that efficiency standards were close 
to IOC levels152. Although Statoil was not truly in competition with other oil companies 
because it was guaranteed an interest in each licence group, it was still able to learn from 
of other oil companies and faced pressure to perform at a similar level.  
 
Where a NOC operates in a nationalised petroleum sector, it is not exposed to any element 
of competition. This has been identified as a key reason for the low levels of commercial 
efficiency in NOCs153. For example, Mexico is the only major Latin American country that 
doesn’t allow IOCs to participate in oil activities with its NOC, Pemex. This has 
contributed to the commercial inefficiency and poor financial performance of Pemex154. In 
contrast, Brazil’s NOC, Petrorbras, began with a monopoly over the oil sector, until 1997 
when its petroleum industry was opened to foreign investment.  Private sector companies 
can now compete against Petrobas for exploration and production licences This opened 
Petrorbras to competition and induced the company to reorganise itself to improve its 
operational and financial performance155. This contributed to its reputation as a particularly 
successful NOC. These two cases illustrate that it is important for a country’s laws to allow 
foreign investment and some element of competition with the NOC. 
 
The presence of private oil companies in joint ventures reduced the amount the state had to 
contribute to exploit its petroleum reserves. The IOCs paid substantially for their licences 
and in taxation. This revenue could then be used by the state to finance its own operations. 
The carried interest and sliding scale provisions additionally helped to reduce the cost 
required to run Statoil. These fiscal and licensing provisions can be implemented outside 
the Norwegian system, provided they are not excessive in a manner that outweighs the 
rewards for IOCs.  
 
In countries that lack financial capital, but aim for the petroleum industry to benefit the 
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broader economic development of the country, a joint venture system mitigates the 
investment risk while potentially improving efficiency.  
 
Separation of functions  
 
The Norwegian Model of separating commercial, regulatory and policy-making functions 
in to separate legal entities is a distinctive feature of how DSP is structured. It is regarded 
as best practice in resource management and endorsed by the NRC. The legal features and 
advantages of this system have been described in section 5.2. In summary, it removes 
conflicts of interest, increases state control of the NOC, enables the NOC to focus on 
commercial functions and the regulator to focus on moderating petroleum activities156. 
However, the model requires significant expenditure and capable civil servants. In 
countries that lack human capital and revenue this model may not be appropriate. 
 
Thurber et al suggest that attempts at this ‘ideal’ model in countries that lack the requisite 
building blocks are fruitless and even counter-productive157. For example, Nigeria has 
attempted a tripartite system during reforms in both the 1980s and 1990s, with the 
Department of Petroleum Resources as the independent regulator. These periods of 
regulatory independence rapidly deteriorated and the Department of Petroleum Resources 
was eventually abolished. Nigeria is again planning to adopt a model that mimics the 
Norwegian system in its 2008 Petroleum Industry Bill, which is yet to become law. There 
is little hope of its success considering the extent of corruption, political meddling and 
resistance to providing a regulatory body with sufficient funding. The Department was 
always unable to procure sufficient resources to oversee and control the oil industry158. In 
countries where the factors that enabled the tripartite model to function in Norway are 
missing, there may be little prospect that implementing this legal structure will be 
worthwhile.  
  
It may be more economical to consolidate limited employees and revenue into one entity. 
For example, Angola has never attempted to create an independent regulator and has 
succeeded in the absence of checks and balances. Sonangol, Angola’s NOC, is the sector 
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manager, regulator and operator. It has primary responsibility for building the oil sector, 
policy-making and implementation in the petroleum industry, providing government 
revenue, issuing licences and conducting negotiations with the oil companies159. In spite of 
these conflicting interests, Sonangol has developed a successful petroleum sector, which 
contrasts sharply with the rest of the struggling Angolan economy. Rather than undermine 
the development of the sector, the choice to consolidate the little talent and revenue it did 
have in to one entity seems to have contributed to its success160. Foreign oil companies 
invested in Angola and the petroleum sector grew, even through a civil war. This suggests 
that creating separate entities may not be necessary to create a well-functioning petroleum 
sector. The question remains however whether Angola’s system would have functioned 
better using the Norwegian Model.  
 
A system of DSP where commercial, regulatory and policy-making functions are all 
consolidated into one legal entity is, however, much more vulnerable than a tripartite 
system. The success of a single entity is highly dependent on the competence of decision-
makers with authority over the NOC. A system without checks and balances risks those 
with power making unwise decisions that are not monitored independently, which is a 
fundamental purpose of separating functions: no particular interest is allowed to dominate. 
In Angola the risk remains that the leaders of Sonangol fail to adequately discharge both 
the regulatory and commercial functions. Moreover, with the lack of an arms length 
relationship between the government and the NOC, government leaders may also come to 
abuse their power over the company. The NOC is liable to become politicised. This can be 
seen in Malaysia, where the NOC is sole regulator and manager of the sector, under the 
direct and binding control of the Prime Minister. It did have a reputation as one of the best-
managed NOCs, but has become increasingly subject to political meddling and used as a 
‘cash cow’ as it became more profitable161. An independent regulator serves to mitigate 
these risks.  
  
Perhaps the solution for countries that lack revenue and human capital initially is to 
implement a structure that represents a middle way between a tripartite and one entity 
system. Brazil’s petroleum industry began with a NOC that combined commercial and 
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regulator functions in one entity. The tripartite system was introduced once Brazil gained 
the revenue, capacity and expertise to do. It now has a highly successful petroleum 
industry and NOC, which has, in part, been attributed to implementing this new system162. 
Thus, while the separation of functions model used in Norway should not be recommended 
as the only option for all countries, it is a more robust system that ought to be used once 
the necessary ‘building blocks’ have been developed.  
  
6.5 Precept 6 of the Natural Resources Charter: does the legal structure of Norwegian 
direct state participation comply?  
 
Section 2.4 clarified the rules under Precept 6. They are promoted as universally applicable 
principles to ensure good resource management of a nationally owned resource company. 
While the legal organisation of Norwegian DSP is in line with the majority of these 
principles, there is some discrepancy in the legal relationship between Statoil and the state. 
Furthermore, Statoil’s relationship with other IOCs was not one of ‘genuine competition’ in 
the early years, again suggesting some difference in the way Statoil was managed 
compared to the ideal that the NRC promotes.  
 
Precept 6 states that the NOC should be organised as a ‘separate legal entity’ and with 
‘governing and management boards separate from the government’. Statoil’s legal status 
between 1972 and 2001 as a 100% state-owned company, with the state as the only 
shareholder, inevitably meant that it was not truly ‘separate’ from the government: it was 
part state entity and part commercial entity. The government was able to direct Statoil’s 
major decisions as its only shareholder and with the Minister for Petroleum and Energy its 
general assembly. Furthermore, the Article 10 reporting requirements meant that the 
government had the opportunity to scrutinise and perhaps adjust the company’s future 
plans. This was intended to ensure political oversight of Statoil, with transparency being 
ensured via a formal and visible process that had to be followed by the state when 
providing directions to Statoil. However, this formalised link was supplemented by 
considerable informal ties between the leaders of Statoil and the Norwegian government. 
For example, Arve Johnsen, Statoil’s first CEO, was formerly deputy minister in the labour 
government. He was known for being politically astute with strong personal ties to those in 
government. These informal links to power reached a point where many considered that 
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the company’s actions could not truly be challenged, culminating in the Mongstad scandal 
and Arve Johnsen’s resignation. These formal and informal links meant that there was not a 
true division of functions between government and NOC. Until Statoil was partly 
privatised in 2001, the arms length relationship between government and NOC that the 
NRC promotes did not truly exist in Norway.  
 
Secondly, Precept 6 states that the NOC should be ‘in open and genuine competition with 
other companies’163. While Statoil did operate alongside IOCs in a competitive 
environment, it was not truly on a level playing field with these other oil companies. 
Statoil’s privileges during the early years gave it certain competitive advantages over and 
above its foreign counterparts. The company was guaranteed a 50% interest in all licence 
groups and had the option to increase this interest if a field was deemed commercial. This 
gave the company a clear advantage in licensing and access to acreage. It was also given a 
priority in the sought-after and influential role of operator, again giving Statoil priority 
over foreign oil companies. Thus, until these privileges were removed, it was a part of 
Norwegian petroleum law that Statoil was not in genuine and open competition with other 
oil companies.  
 
While both these factors mean that the management of Statoil was not totally in line with 
the NRC, they were implemented for good reason. During the early years of Norway’s 
petroleum industry, the state did not have the necessary finance or expertise to establish a 
strong NOC. The privileges were necessary because Statoil was a weak company relative 
to the IOCs, and needed to become competent in a relatively short space of time. Once this 
had been achieved, Statoil’s privileges were removed and it operated in a more genuinely 
competitive environment with other oil companies. Statoil’s formal links to the state were 
also necessary during the early years. The objective in establishing a NOC was to uphold 
national interests in petroleum operations. To ensure this, the government needed to 
maintain a degree of political influence over the company. Once the objectives had been 
achieved, the formal links were removed by partly privatising Statoil. Even the informal 
ties served a purpose: it was Arve Johnsen that lobbied hard to secure Statoil’s privileges 
and other advantages during Statoil’s formative years.  
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Thus, while the NRC mandates certain universally applicable principles that are, on the 
whole, in line with the Norwegian experience, these two concepts may need to be revised. 
It is unrealistic to expect a complete separation between NOC and government. The state 
must exercise a degree of influence to ensure the company upholds the state’s objectives. It 
is also necessary to grant certain advantages to the NOC, since it must be enabled to catch 
up to the strength and competence of the IOCs in order to achieve the government’s 
objectives. Both of these aspects of a NOC’s legal organisation will need to be reformed in 
line with Precept 6 once their purpose has been served, but during the early years at least it 
may be more astute to follow Norway’s example.  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the Norwegian Model of DSP should be used in resource-rich developing 
countries as part of the solution to the resource curse, but only where there is a genuine 
attempt to abide by the key legal features of this model. The main features include a 
limited commercial function, transparency requirements, separating functions between 
government entities and operating in partnership with foreign oil companies. Furthermore, 
for the company to remain effective and efficient, legal reforms must be implemented as 
circumstances in the oil sector change. Although this model would be a challenge to 
replicate in a developing country, its particular design would help to limit the problems 
often associated with state-owned companies and capture some of the benefits of a 
liberalised model. It must though be tailored to the specific needs and political, economic 
and cultural realities of the country in question. Few countries will possess the same initial 
advantages as Norway and must make the system work in the context of limited funds, 
expertise and weak institutions. Moreover, to succeed DSP must also be complemented by 
good resource management at each important stage in the decision-making chain, from 
extraction to the use of revenue.  After all, DSP is only part of the solution to the resource 
curse. 
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